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Introduction 
 
 
India’s Position in International 
Climate Negotiations 
No Shift under Modi 
Susanne Dröge and Christian Wagner 
International negotiations over a post-2020 climate agreement have brought increased 
calls for India to participate in climate protection efforts. India is currently in a para-
doxical situation. On the one hand, in demanding financial and technological support 
for climate policy, India shares the same interests as most of the developing countries. 
On the other hand, its rapid economic growth has made it one of the world’s leading 
emitters of greenhouse gases. Yet in contrast to China, which announced in 2014 that 
it would start cutting its emissions around 2030, India does not see itself as having 
any obligation to take on more international responsibility for climate protection. Its 
pledges for the December 2015 climate summit in Paris will therefore be moderate. 
Industrialized countries can at least indirectly contribute to improving climate pro-
tection in India by further expanding their bilateral cooperation in the energy and 
environmental sector. 
 
The new Indian government under Naren-
dra Modi leaves no doubt that its priorities 
lie in the area of economic development 
rather than in environmental and climate 
policy. The new large-scale initiative “Make 
in India” is aimed at strengthening the 
manufacturing infrastructure, promoting 
foreign direct investment, and facilitating 
technology transfer. Modi hopes this will 
bring economic growth back up to seven to 
eight percent annually—from a rather low 
rate of around five percent in 2014 before 
he took office. The major expansion of the 
manufacturing sector envisioned under 
this initiative will increase Indian carbon 
emissions further. India is now the world’s 
third largest emitter of greenhouse gases, 
but in contrast to China (first largest) and 
the USA (second largest), it has still not 
announced a national climate target in the 
course of the international process under 
the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
India’s energy supply 
Since India’s economic liberalization of 
1991, energy security has been a key issue 
in the country’s domestic and foreign policy, 
yet the supply problems remain unresolved. 
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The Indian energy market is still highly 
fragmented, and there are conflicts of juris-
diction between central and state govern-
ments. Furthermore, due to the country’s 
low generation capacities and lack of a 
reliable and efficient energy infrastructure, 
India is unable to guarantee the volume and 
uninterrupted supply of energy urgently 
needed by large manufacturing companies. 
Despite significant investments and im-
provements in the energy sector, India still 
has the worst overall level of household 
energy poverty of any of the major emerg-
ing economies. The term “energy poverty” 
refers to a lack of access to modern energy 
infrastructure, that is, to electricity and 
decentralized energy. In India, traditional 
biomass (wood, dung, or charcoal) is the 
most widely used energy source. Sixty-six 
percent of the population cooks on wood or 
coal stoves, which are detrimental above all 
to human health. Twenty-five percent of the 
Indian population has no access to electrici-
ty. The corresponding figures for China are 
29 percent (biomass) and 1 percent (no elec-
tricity), and for South Africa, 13 and 15 per-
cent, respectively. India has now abolished 
its subsidies for gasoline and diesel, but still 
provides both indirect and direct subsidies 
for kerosene, liquefied petroleum gas, ferti-
lizers, and electricity. This puts a strain on 
the national budget, causes emissions to 
increase, and promotes energy waste. For 
years, air pollution in major Indian cities 
has been increasing at an alarming rate. 
Yet so far, there is no sign of a mass protest 
movement emerging among the urban 
middle class comparable to the anti-corrup-
tion movement of 2011. 
India has the largest coal reserves in the 
world, but the coal is of low quality. Large 
portions of India’s coal reserves cannot be 
developed due to delays in licensing, and 
investment projects are on hold because 
authorities have not issued the necessary 
permits. The infrastructure that would 
be crucially needed to transport the coal 
from the interior to manufacturing centers 
along the coast is also lacking. For all these 
reasons, India is forced to continue import-
ing coal. The country is also heavily depen-
dent on oil and gas imports, mainly from 
supplier countries in the politically un-
stable Gulf region and Middle East, such as 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. Its dependency on 
these countries will increase in the years to 
come. 
For several years, India has been promot-
ing renewable energy—especially wind and 
solar. The US-India Civil Nuclear Coopera-
tion Initiative (CNCI) was launched in 2005 
with the aim of expanding the production 
of nuclear energy. But since India’s liability 
legislation covers not only power plant 
operators but also plant manufacturers, no 
significant investments in nuclear power 
generation have been made since then. On 
his visit to Delhi in January 2015, US Presi-
dent Barack Obama met with India’s Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi to seek agreement 
on this contentious issue. No details were 
released, however, on how legal certainty 
would be provided to foreign investors. 
India’s environmental and 
climate policy 
Even today, a quote from Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi is often heard in discussions 
on environmental policy in India. In her 
statement at the first UN environment sum-
mit in Stockholm in 1972, Gandhi asked: 
“Are not poverty and need the greatest 
polluters?” This is emblematic of the con-
tinued primacy of the fight against poverty 
over environmental issues in Indian politics. 
Starting in the 1990s, however, a lively pub-
lic debate began to emerge around national 
environmental problems and climate policy. 
The mounting impacts of environmental 
pollution and the intensified international 
discussion of climate change led the govern-
ment under Manmohan Singh to adopt the 
National Action Plan on Climate Change in 
2008. 
The Modi government’s economic policy 
priorities focus on industrialization, for-
eign direct investment, technology transfer, 
and India’s participation in the internation-
al division of labor. Nevertheless, energy 
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and environmental questions play a major 
role as well, given India’s close cooperation 
with the most important industrialized 
countries in these areas. 
Along with efforts to expand the use of 
renewable energies, India has also launched 
an initiative to improve city planning under 
the banner of “Smart Cities.” Other projects 
include cleaning up the Ganges, the sacred 
river of the Hindus, as well as the high-
profile “My Clean India” campaign, which 
commenced with the Indian Prime Minister 
personally sweeping an area of street. The 
Modi government plans to invest 100 bil-
lion US dollars over the next seven years to 
expand solar energy generation to reach a 
capacity of 100,000 megawatts. That would 
be the equivalent of more than thirty times 
current levels of solar generation. 
The United States plans to finance 
projects in this area totaling one billion 
dollars and to provide expertise to three 
of India’s Smart Cities. Germany’s Federal 
Environment Minister Barbara Hendricks 
also pledged to support the Smart Cities 
initiative on a visit to India in late January 
2015. Germany has been participating in 
the financing of solar projects such as 
photovoltaic power plants for several years 
now. Yet up to the present, India’s bilateral 
cooperation with Germany and the Euro-
pean Union (EU) on energy and environ-
mental policy has failed to spill over into a 
broader shift in India’s foreign policy prior-
ities in the area of international climate 
policy. 
Indian environmental organizations are 
indeed concerned that Modi’s manufactur-
ing drive may come at a cost to the environ-
ment. The administration’s strategy includes 
reducing environmental standards for in-
dustrial projects and accelerating approval 
processes. International non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) like Greenpeace are 
being watched more closely by government 
security agencies. The activities of some 
national NGOs in support of Indian anti-
nuclear groups are considered to be against 
the national interest. In line with this, 
many NGOs are to be subjected to intensi-
fied scrutiny, including stricter monitoring 
of their financial inflows from abroad. The 
Delhi High Court ruled in January 2015, 
however, that the freezing of Greenpeace 
funds by the Indian government was un-
constitutional, and ordered that the funds 
be unblocked and credited to Greenpeace 
India. 
India’s international climate agenda 
In India, there is broad cross-party consensus 
against outside interference in internal 
affairs—for instance, through internation-
ally binding agreements. In the global con-
text, India is therefore considered a “coun-
try that can’t say yes”, as has been observed 
in environmental and climate negotiations 
for many years. In particular, India has been 
emphatic in stressing the importance of the 
Common But Differentiated Responsibil-
ities and Respective Capacities (CBDR&RC) 
principle contained in the UNFCCC. Accord-
ing to this principle, the burdens of climate 
policy should be shared in an equitable 
way and according to the capacities of the 
country in question. Key parameters are a 
country’s per capita emissions, historical 
share of greenhouse gas emissions, and 
economic capability. From India’s point of 
view, this implies that the industrialized 
countries hold greater responsibility for 
climate protection and that they should 
lead the way, allowing developing countries 
like India the same development opportu-
nities that the industrialized countries 
enjoyed. 
India has, in fact, put forward a series 
of climate policy proposals. In 2007, Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh announced the 
Singh Convergence Principle (SCP), which 
was named after him. It states that India’s 
per capita CO2 emissions should never be 
higher than those of the industrialized 
countries. Yet this created the impression 
that India’s middle class—whose lifestyles 
and carbon emissions hardly differ from 
those of the industrialized countries—was 
hiding behind the country’s large poor 
population. Environment Minister Jairam 
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Ramesh announced in 2009 at the Copen-
hagen Climate summit that India would 
cut its carbon emissions by 20 to 25 percent 
up to 2020 compared with 2005 levels. 
India and the EU in the run-up to 
the Paris conference 
Under the government of Prime Minister 
Modi, there are few signs that India will 
change its position in the upcoming cli-
mate negotiations. Both economically 
and politically, India is currently in the 
comfortable situation of being courted 
by numerous potential partners. Foreign 
investors hope to gain better access to the 
Indian market through the removal of 
bureaucratic hurdles. And countries like 
the United States, Japan, and China are 
pursuing not only economic but also geo-
strategic interests in their efforts to build 
closer relationships with India. 
India will play a significant role in inter-
national preparations for the negotiations 
in Paris. On the one hand, India has the 
same interests as many other G77 states. On 
the other hand, India is capable of blocking 
negotiations together with other emerging 
countries as it did in Copenhagen in 2009. 
In the current process of preparing for the 
Paris conference, the new Indian govern-
ment will not meet the March deadline for 
announcing its (“intended nationally deter-
mined”) contributions to the new agree-
ment. Its announcement is not expected 
before mid-year, after the budget for 2015 
has been passed and the climate agenda has 
been agreed upon between India’s national 
and state governments (eight initiatives 
havealready been launched for solar energy, 
energy efficiency, water, ecosystems, agri-
culture, etc.). The Indian Environment 
Minister Prakash Javadekar announced in 
February 2015 that India’s contributions 
tothe UNFCCC process would not be empty 
promises. Even if India has postponed 
announcing its climate targets, its partici-
pation in the voluntary commitment pro-
cess is one step that is consistent with its 
position to date. 
A showdown in the final hours of 
UNFCCC negotiations of the kind that took 
place between India and the EU in 2011 
in Durban will not be repeated. There, the 
EU was able to count on a large number of 
developing countries in the G77 for support 
(the “Durban Alliance”). But now, most of 
these countries have shifted their positions 
in the process. They are interested primari-
ly in obtaining long-term financial commit-
ments and technological support for adapt-
ing to the impacts of climate change. They 
appear to have lost faith in effective global 
climate protection and in the EU’s leader-
ship role. So when it comes to negotiating 
the details of an agreement, their positions 
will be oriented more towards China and 
India—especially since it is still not clear 
what the EU is willing to offer in 2015. 
India is able to rely largely on bilateral 
channels for the financial support and 
technology transfers it needs for its energy 
projects. As long as the international cli-
mate process does not limit its options in 
this area, India will not block the negotia-
tions. However, there is little indication that 
India will participate in an internationally 
binding climate agreement that involves 
monitoring and review mechanisms for 
national climate protection. This is the atti-
tude that also predominates in the discus-
sion in India over the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs). For Germany, this means 
that the most effective way of supporting 
climate protection in India is to pursue 
even more intensive bilateral cooperation. 
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